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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a thirty-eight-year-old female patient who has suffered three 
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spontaneous miscarriages within the past two years and is now seeking treatment 
at a local fertility clinic. Preliminary tests show that the patient’s most recent 
abortus (i.e., an aborted fetus less than twelve weeks old) contains several 
chromosomal abnormalities (also known as “aneuploidies”), and the physician 
determines that preimplantation genetic screening (PGS)1 may be warranted to 
help counter the patient’s history of recurrent pregnancy loss. The fertility clinic is 
familiar with traditional aneuploidy screening techniques, which involve biopsying 
one to two cells from cleavage-stage embryos and conducting fluorescent in situ 
hybridization (FISH) analysis—a procedure that was developed over ten years ago 
and is frequently practiced by a majority of fertility clinics that assist in the 
identification and transfer of viable embryos.2 The physician, through her own 
independent research, learns of a fairly new PGS-aneuploidy screening technique 
that (a) is less likely to damage the patient’s embryos (which are, without question, 
invaluable to individuals struggling with infertility) during the biopsy step, and (b) 
yields more complete, accurate, and reliable genetic information than FISH 
analysis. However, PGS-aneuploidy screening is still regarded as an experimental 
technique within the medical community.3 Additionally, the American Society for 
Reproductive Medicine’s (ASRM)4 existing clinical practice guidelines (CPGs) 
recommend against the routine application of PGS-aneuploidy screening in 
patients diagnosed with repetitive pregnancy loss.5 Moreover, the ASRM’s CPGs 
fail to recommend preferred PGS-aneuploidy screening protocols that would 
signal the standard of care that is expected of a physician performing these 
procedures.6 
The physician is now confronted with a difficult choice—should she 
minimize her risk of liability by recommending the traditional aneuploidy 
screening technique that has been available for the past decade and appears to be a 
customary practice within the field? Or should she recommend the newer, 
optimized technique that is arguably more beneficial in terms of clinical outcome, 
but is not yet a generally accepted practice? Legal ambiguity as to what the proper 
standard of care is under these circumstances creates uncertainty about the risk of 
malpractice liability for adopting emerging technologies that are not yet generally 
 
1. PGS is a technique that seeks to improve the outcomes of assisted reproductive treatments 
by ensuring that the embryos selected for transfer are chromosomally normal. 
2. Elpida Fragouli & Dagan Wells, Aneuploidy Screening for Embryo Selection, 30 SEMINARS 
REPROD. MED. 289, 290 (2012). 
3. Practice Comm. of the Soc’y for Assisted Reprod. Tech. & Practice Comm. of the Am. 
Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Preimplantation Genetic Testing: A Practice Committee Opinion, 90 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY S136, S141–42 (2008) [hereinafter SART & ASRM]. 
4. The ASRM is a professional medical society that oversees developments in the field of 
reproductive medicine. About Us: Vision of ASRM, ASRM, http://www.asrm.org/about/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2014). 
5. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Evaluation and Treatment of Recurrent 
Pregnancy Loss: A Committee Opinion, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1103, 1105 (2012) [hereinafter 
ASRM]. 
6. See id.; SART & ASRM, supra note 3. 
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accepted by the medical community. Such uncertainty may effectively deter 
physicians from adopting new medical techniques and devices, even if the 
technologies offer broad social benefits in the form of superior clinical outcomes. 
An unfortunate side effect of this reluctance is that patients with poor medical 
prognoses are more likely to receive suboptimal PGS-aneuploidy screening 
services because physicians either fail to recommend or to provide the improved 
technology. 
One possible solution is to impose a legal duty on assisted reproductive 
technology (ART) specialists to offer and provide optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening services as part of the standard of care for patients that have an elevated 
risk of miscarriage or low implantation rates. However, despite the vast literature 
on the legal, social, and ethical ramifications of preimplantation genetic diagnostic 
(PGD) testing,7 there is barely any scholarship that directly addresses the standard 
of care that ART physicians owe to their patients in the context of adopting 
emerging technologies. This Note attempts to resolve this apparent gap by 
defining a standard of care that is dynamic, easy to administrate, and circumvents 
the problems of over- and underinclusiveness, thereby ensuring that similarly 
situated defendants will be treated equally under the law. Ease of application 
reduces the burden on courts, juries, and litigants by facilitating the resolution of 
malpractice claims. Dynamism, or flexibility, guarantees that the law adapts to 
“changes and improvement in medical science.”8 Circumventing the problems of 
over- and underinclusiveness involves tailoring the law as closely as possible, 
neither to hold too many nor too few defendants accountable for their conduct. 
Part I evaluates the clinical benefits of integrating optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening with routine in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures, especially in patients 
with an elevated risk of implantation failure or recurrent pregnancy loss. Part II 
explores current legal doctrines that define a physician’s standard of care in the 
context of adopting novel medical technologies. Part III of this Note argues that 
courts should apply the “reasonable physician” standard rather than a custom-
based, or CPG-based, standard of care with respect to emerging ART 
technologies if the end goal is to remain fair and realistic as the practice of 
reproductive medicine continues to evolve. Ultimately, this Note argues that 
imposing a duty on ART physicians to provide optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening services as part of the standard of care is both tenable and opportune in 
 
7. See, e.g., COLIN GAVAGHAN, DEFENDING THE GENETIC SUPERMARKET: LAW AND 
ETHICS OF SELECTING THE NEXT GENERATION (Sheila A.M. McLean ed., 2007); 
REPROGENETICS: LAW, POLICY, AND ETHICAL ISSUES (Lori P. Knowles & Gregory E. Kaebnick 
eds., 2007); ROSAMUND SCOTT, CHOOSING BETWEEN POSSIBLE LIVES: LAW AND ETHICS OF 
PRENATAL AND PREIMPLANTATION GENETIC DIAGNOSIS (2007); THE SORTING SOCIETY (Loane 
Skene & Janna Thompson eds., 2008); Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting 
Gender, Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241 (2005). 
8. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001). 
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light of recent advances in comprehensive molecular cytogenetics and embryo 
biopsy procedures. 
I.  ASSESSING THE CLINICAL BENEFITS OF  
OPTIMIZED PGS-ANEUPLOIDY SCREENING TECHNIQUES 
One of the major challenges ART physicians currently face is how to reduce 
the risk of multiple pregnancy while improving overall pregnancy rates. As the 
ART field attempts to move toward single embryo transfer, developing reliable 
methods that accurately predict which embryos are likely to produce a healthy 
child becomes increasingly important. Chromosomal abnormality, or aneuploidy, 
negatively impacts embryo viability and is one of the major causes of recurrent 
miscarriages9 and failed IVF attempts.10 One proposal to improve implantation 
and pregnancy rates after IVF involves the identification and preferential transfer 
of chromosomally normal (euploid) embryos since the transfer of a 
chromosomally abnormal embryo is unlikely to result in a healthy live birth.11 For 
the past decade, a growing number of fertility clinics have adopted chromosome 
screening techniques to assist in the identification and transfer of viable 
embryos.12 The most common approach involves the biopsy of one or two cells 
from embryos at the cleavage stage (three days after fertilization), followed by 
chromosomal analysis via FISH and the preferential transfer of euploid embryos.13 
This approach is commonly referred to as PGS, and has mostly been targeted at 
patients with poor medical prognoses, such as recurrent pregnancy loss, repeated 
implantation failure, or advanced maternal age.14 Although several pioneering 
groups have reported improvements in IVF outcomes after PGS,15 a number of 
 
9. M.D. Stephenson et al., Cytogenetic Analysis of Miscarriages from Couples with Recurrent Miscarriage: 
A Case-Control Study, 17 HUM. REPROD. 446, 446–51 (2002). 
10. Y. Verlinsky et al., Pregnancies Following Pre-Conception Diagnosis of Common Aneuploidies by 
Fluorescent In-Situ Hybridization, 10 HUM. REPROD. 1923, 1923–27 (1995). 
11. Santiago Munné, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis and Human Implantation—A Review, 24 
PLACENTA S70, S70–S76 (2003). 
12. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 290. 
13. Id. (“[T]he vast majority of PGS cases have continued to be conducted on day 3. The 
reasons for the continued application of chromosome screening at the cleavage stage may be due to 
most embryologists having little experience with embryo biopsy at other stages, limiting exploration 
of alternatives, and due to publications providing reassurance that . . . the proportion of embryos 
misdiagnosed is low.”). 
14. Santiago Munné et al., Diagnosis of Major Chromosome Aneuploidies in Human Preimplantation 
Embryos, 8 HUM. REPROD. 2185, 2185–91 (1993). 
15. See John G. Garrisi et al., Effect of Infertility, Maternal Age and Number of Previous Miscarriages on 
the Outcome of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Idiopathic Recurrent Pregnancy Loss, 92 FERTILITY & 
STERILITY 288, 288–95 (2009); Luca Gianaroli et al., Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis Increases the 
Implantation Rate in Human In Vitro Fertilization by Avoiding the Transfer of Chromosomally Abnormal 
Embryos, 68 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1128, 1128–31 (1997); Santiago Munné et al., Improved 
Implantation After Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis of Aneuploidy, 7 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 91, 
91–97 (2003); Santiago Munné et al., Positive Outcome After Preimplantation Diagnosis of Aneuploidy in 
Human Embryos, 14 HUM. REPROD. 2191, 2191–99 (1999); Santiago Munné et al., Preimplantation 
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studies have failed to demonstrate improvements in IVF outcomes for patients of 
advanced maternal age, thus causing researchers to question the clinical efficacy of 
PGS screening.16 In fact, a seminal study revealed that the ongoing pregnancy rate 
and live birth rate were significantly lower in women who underwent PGS 
screening compared to their untreated counterparts.17 
There are several biological and technical explanations for why PGS via 
FISH failed to improve implantation and pregnancy rates. First, PGS is based on 
the faulty assumptions that the single cell biopsied is representative of the rest of 
the embryo given, and that approximately twenty to forty percent of human 
cleavage-stage embryos are mosaic.18 Embryonic mosaicism thus poses significant 
accuracy problems for diagnostics based on the sampling of a single cell. Second, 
PGS specialists cannot improve testing accuracy by running duplicate experiments 
because the biopsied cell only provides enough genetic material to conduct one to 
two genetic tests, at most.19 Third, the removal of even a single cell from a 
cleavage-stage embryo may lead to reduced viability and implantation rates.20 This 
reduction in implantation rate is likely to be much higher if experienced 
practitioners do not perform the biopsy procedure, which could potentially 
eliminate any benefit obtained by embryo screening.21 Fourth, the overall 
 
Genetic Diagnosis Significantly Reduces Pregnancy Loss in Infertile Couples: A Multicenter Study, 85 FERTILITY 
& STERILITY 326, 326–32 (2006). 
16. See T. Hardarson et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening in Women of Advanced Maternal Age 
Caused a Decrease in Clinical Pregnancy Rate: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 23 HUM. REPROD. 2806, 2806–
12 (2008); Sebastiaan Mastenbroek et al., In Vitro Fertilization with Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 357 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 9, 9–17 (2007); Catherine Staessen et al., Comparison of Blastocyst Transfer with or 
Without Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Aneuploidy Screening in Couples with Advanced Maternal Age: A 
Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial, 19 HUM. REPROD. 2849, 2849–58 (2004). 
17. Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 9; see also Hardarson et al., supra note 16, at 2806. 
18. Evelyne Vanneste et al., Chromosome Instability Is Common in Human Cleavage-Stage Embryos, 
15 NATURE MED. 577, 577–83 (2009); Lucille Voullaire et al., Chromosome Analysis of Blastomeres from 
Human Embryos by Using Comparative Genomic Hybridization, 106 HUM. GENETICS 210, 210–17 (2000). 
Mosaicism refers to a condition where not every cell in the embryo has the same chromosome 
structure. 
19.  Jaime King, Predicting Probability: Regulating the Future of Preimplantation Genetic Screening, 8 
YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 283, 297–98 (2008) (“Having only the biopsied cell’s DNA 
available for testing greatly limits testing options . . . . Currently, couples must choose between 
conducting an analysis on five to nine chromosomes and conducting one to two genetic tests, as these 
tests examine the DNA in different ways.”). 
20. Jacques Cohen et al., Removal of 2 Cells from Cleavage Stage Embryos Is Likely to Reduce the 
Efficacy of Chromosomal Tests That Are Used to Enhance Implantation Rates, 87 FERTILITY & STERILITY 
496, 496–503 (2007); A. De Vos et al., Impact of Cleavage-Stage Embryo Biopsy in View of PGD on Human 
Blastocyst Implantation: A Prospective Cohort of Single Embryo Transfers, 24 HUM. REPROD. 2988, 2988–96 
(2009). 
21. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 291; William B. Schoolcraft et al., Clinical Application of 
Comprehensive Chromosomal Screening at the Blastocyst Stage, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1700, 1704 
(2010). Excessive biopsy damage appears to have been a contributing factor in at least one PGS study 
that found no benefit of chromosome screening. Jacques Cohen & James A. Grifo, Multicentre Trial of 
Preimplantation Genetic Screening Reported in the New England Journal of Medicine: An In-Depth Look at the 
Findings, 15 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 365, 365–66 (2007); Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 
Pioneers from the USA and Europe Refute New England Journal of Medicine Article, MED. NEWS TODAY  
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effectiveness of single-cell FISH analysis is hampered by several technical 
limitations. Single-cell FISH involves technically challenging steps, like cell fixation 
on a microscope slide that is sensitive to changes in temperature and humidity, 
and if performed incorrectly, can yield inconclusive results.22 Furthermore, more 
than one-half of the chromosomes in each biopsied cell remain unexamined after 
FISH analysis,23 enabling some chromosomally abnormal embryos to be classified 
as “normal,” and thus erroneously selected for transfer.24 
Fortunately, advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening have led to the creation 
of techniques that overcome most of the problems that limit FISH-based PGS 
methods. The first improvement involves performing the embryo-biopsy 
procedure at the blastocyst stage, two days later than traditional PGS methods.25 
Unlike individual cells in cleavage-stage embryos, trophectoderm cells sampled 
during blastocyst biopsy have much lower rates of mosaicism, and are thus highly 
representative of the remainder of the embryo.26 Although it is typical to extract 
about five cells, the relative proportion of the embryo volume that is removed 
during the blastocyst stage is smaller than that associated with single-cell biopsy at 
the cleavage stage.27 Moreover trophectoderm cells are destined to form the 
placenta rather than the actual fetus.28 Thus, unlike cleavage-stage embryo biopsy, 
trophectoderm sampling is less likely to be detrimental to embryo viability, a 
notion that is supported by high survival and implantation rates.29 Emerging data 
also reveals that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies, like 
comparative genomic hybridization (CGH), SNP microarrays, and qPCR-based 
comprehensive chromosome screening (CCS) technology, could offer clinical 
benefits to certain women at high risk for an aneuploid pregnancy.30 Furthermore, 
 
( July 10, 2007, 1:00 AM), http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/76269.php [hereinafter PGD 
Pioneers]. 
22. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 291. 
23. Id. at 290 (“This was due to the fact that only five distinct colors (fluorochromes) in the 
visible spectrum were available for probe labeling, and consequently the number of chromosomes 
that could be simultaneously assessed was limited . . . .”). 
24. King, supra note 19, at 293 n.37. Even the best FISH-based methods fail to detect about 
twenty percent of abnormal embryos, not to mention other FISH-based methods where more than 
one-half of the abnormal embryos may go undetected. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1704. 
25. Single Euploid Blastocyst Transfer Recent Technology, FERTILITY CTR. & APPLIED GENETICS 
FLA., http://geneticsandfertility.com/blastocyst-transfer-recent-technology/ (last visited Oct. 22, 
2014). 
26. E. Fragouli et al., Comprehensive Molecular Cytogenetic Analysis of the Human Blastocyst Stage, 23 
HUM. REPROD. 2596, 2596–608 (2008). 
27. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 296. 
28. Id. 
29. Steven J. McArthur et al., Pregnancies and Live Births After Trophectoderm Biopsy and 
Preimplantation Genetic Testing of Human Blastocysts, 84 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1628, 1628–36 (2005); 
Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1704. 
30. E.J. Forman et al., Single Embryo Transfer with Comprehensive Chromosome Screening Results in 
Improved Ongoing Pregnancy Rates and Decreased Miscarriage Rates, 27 HUM. REPROD. 1217, 1217–22 (2012) 
(evaluating the efficacy of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS in an infertile population); 
Ali Hellani et al., Successful Pregnancies After Application of Array-Comparative Genomic Hybridization in PGS-
Aneuploidy Screening, 17 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 841, 843 (2008) (showing successful clinical 
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several recent studies show that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic 
methodologies also improve the success rate of single-embryo transfers in good 
prognosis IVF patients, thereby reducing the risk of a multiple pregnancy.31 Taken 
together, these data strongly suggest that PGS screening can improve IVF 
outcomes in patients, regardless of age or medical prognosis. 
PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques involving CGH, SNP, or CCS are 
diagnostically superior because, unlike FISH-based methods, they can gather 
information on the entire chromosome complement of individual cells, thereby 
minimizing the likelihood of selecting chromosomally abnormal embryos for 
transfer.32 These screening methods are less difficult compared to FISH because 
they do not require cell fixation on a microscope slide,33 and the two to five cells 
removed during trophectoderm biopsy provide more than enough starting genetic 
material to analyze all twenty-three pairs of chromosomes.34 Perhaps the most 
important advantage that these comprehensive molecular cytogenetic approaches 
have over FISH is that they are far less susceptible to errors caused by mosaicism 
than FISH, and thus, they maximize the likelihood of identifying euploid embryos 
for preferential transfer.35 
 
application of CGH-based screening in advanced maternal age patients with recurrent IVF failures); 
Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1705; William B. Schoolcraft et al., Comprehensive Chromosome 
Screening (CSS) with Vitrification Results in Improved Clinical Outcome in Women >35 Years: A Randomized 
Control Trial, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY S1, S1 (2012) (finding that interrogating embryos by array-
CGH resulted in significantly higher pregnancy rates compared to non-PGS-treated controls); William 
B. Schoolcraft et al., Live Birth Outcome with Trophectoderm Biopsy, Blastocyst Vitrification, and Single-
Nucleotide Polymorphism Microarray-Based Comprehensive Chromosome Screening in Infertile Patients, 96 
FERTILITY & STERILITY 638, 639 (2011) (finding that the combination of trophectoderm biopsy, 
blastocyst vitrification, and SNP microarrays for CCS results in high implantation and live birth rates 
in infertile patients); R.T. Scott, Jr. et al., A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial Demonstrating 
Significantly Increased Clinical Pregnancy Rates Following 24 Chromosome Aneuploidy Screening: Biopsy and 
Analysis on Day 5 with Fresh Transfer, 94 FERTILITY & STERILITY S2, S2 (2010) (evaluating the efficacy 
of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS in IVF patients less than forty-three years of age 
with no history of failed cycles). 
31. E.J. Forman et al., Blastocyst Euploid Selective Transfer (BEST): An RCT of Comprehensive 
Chromosome Screening–Single Embryo Transfer (CCS-SET) vs Double Embryo Transfer (DET)—Equivalent 
Pregnancy Rates, Eliminates Twins, 98 FERTILITY & STERILITY S49, S49 (2012) (evaluating the efficacy 
of single embryo transfer with qPCR-based CCS compared to the current standard of care, a double 
unscreened embryo transfer); Zhihong Yang et al., Selection of Single Blastocysts for Fresh Transfer via 
Standard Morphology Assessment Alone and with Array CGH for Good Prognosis IVF Patients: Results from a 
Randomized Pilot Study, 5 MOLECULAR CYTOGENETICS 24, 24 (2012) (evaluating the efficacy of single 
embryo transfer with CGH in good prognosis IVF patients). 
32. See studies cited supra notes 29–31. 
33. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1705. 
34. Paul R. Brezina et al., Single-Gene Testing Combined with Single Nucleotide Polymorphism 
Microarray Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Aneuploidy: A Novel Approach in Optimizing Pregnancy 
Outcome, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1786.e5, 1786.e6 (2011). 
35. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 297. 
Specifically, methods such as aCGH or SNP microarrays provide an average view of the 
biopsied TE sample, and aneuploidy is generally not detected unless it is present in more 
than a third of the cells sampled. It could be argued that the failure to detect low levels of  
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In sum, studies combining optimized biopsy procedures and comprehensive 
molecular cytogenetic screening methods have, thus far, yielded extremely 
promising IVF outcomes, and “may finally allow preimplantation genetic 
screening to achieve the benefits predicted by theory.”36 Advances in PGS-
aneuploidy screening represent a major milestone in the medical community’s 
movement toward single embryo transfer, and have the potential to transform 
routine medical procedures in fertility clinics throughout the globe. 
II. CONTEMPORARY LEGAL DOCTRINES GOVERNING  
A PHYSICIAN’S STANDARD OF CARE FOR  
EMERGING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES 
Early adoption of cutting-edge medical technologies by physicians is 
accompanied by some degree of malpractice liability risk. The standard of care for 
malpractice liability claims varies between jurisdictions but generally requires an 
evaluation of the physician’s conduct against professional custom, or the 
“reasonable physician” standard.37 At the same time, medical malpractice and 
negligence doctrines make it clear that standards of care are evolutionary rather 
than static, and health-care providers have a “duty to stay abreast” of new 
techniques and advances.38 But the simple recognition that medical knowledge 
evolves over time 
provides scarce insight into the reality that those changes do not occur 
seamlessly, but by fits and starts, with the serial introduction of a 
multitude of new drugs, new devices, and new techniques, each of which 
starts out as experimental agent with imperfectly known risks, and each 
of which involves a departure from what most physicians are doing, ex 
ante, in providing care for their patients.39 
Far less clear is how the standard of care analysis applies to a situation where an 
injury results from the use of emerging technologies that have not yet been 
incorporated into the standard customary practices of most physicians. 
Part II is thus concerned with identifying the existing legal frameworks that 
define a physician’s standard of care for adopting emerging medical technologies. 
Part II.A examines the courts’ movement away from a custom-based standard of 
 
abnormal cells is a disadvantage of these methods applied to blastocyst biopsies. However, 
in most cases, low-level mosaicism is probably of little clinical significance. 
Id. 
36. Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1700. 
37. Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 
57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 165–88 (2000); Donald E. Kacmar, Note, The Impact of Computerized 
Medical Literature Databases on Medical Malpractice Litigation: Time for Another Helling v. Carey Wake-Up 
Call?, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 617, 647 (1997). 
38. See generally Carter L. Williams, Note, Evidence-Based Medicine in the Law Beyond Clinical Practice 
Guidelines: What Effect Will EBM Have on the Standard of Care?, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 479, 508–12 
(2004). 
39. Michael D. Greenberg, Medical Malpractice and New Devices: Defining an Elusive Standard of 
Care, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 423, 424–25 (2009). 
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care, toward a “reasonable physician” standard of care. Part II.B delves into the 
commonly recited yet nebulous duty to stay abreast and its impact on the 
appropriate standard of care for medical professionals. Part II.C explains why 
CPGs, despite their usefulness, should not be treated as the panacea for 
determining the standard of care. Finally, Part II.D analyzes the common law 
doctrine of the duty to inform patients of a newly developed, alternative therapy. 
Taken together, these concepts and legal frameworks help mitigate a physician’s 
reluctance in adopting new technologies due to the ill-defined malpractice liability 
risks associated with doing so. A liberal interpretation of the malpractice standard 
of care with respect to emerging technologies would promote both physician and 
patient autonomy, foster innovation and rapid optimization of new medical 
techniques and devices, and reduce costs on patients, thereby contributing to an 
elevated standard of professional care. 
A. The Demise of Judicial Deference to Custom in Medical Malpractice 
The goal of the malpractice standard of care is to ensure that physicians 
fulfill their professional obligations with appropriate skill and care. Much like a 
negligence claim, to prevail in a medical malpractice suit, the plaintiff must prove 
that (1) the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached that 
duty, and (3) the plaintiff’s injuries were causally related to the defendant’s 
breach.40 What separates a medical malpractice claim from an ordinary negligence 
claim is the duty owed by the defendant, or the “standard of care.” Physicians 
traditionally have only needed to conform to the customs of their peers.41 
Consequently, the relevant inquiry under a custom-based standard of care is not 
whether the defendant behaved like a reasonable person (or even a reasonable 
physician for that matter), but instead whether the defendant’s actions were 
consistent with professional norms. Thus, evidence of the ineffectiveness of 
customary practices is often excluded under the custom-based standard of care.42 
A key concern with maintaining a custom-based standard of care is that the 
 
40. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164–
65 (5th ed. 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965). 
41. See 61 AM. JUR. 2D PHYSICIANS, SURGEONS & OTHER HEALERS § 348 (1981). 
Historically, a jury’s determination of the applicable standard of care was limited by the “locality rule,” 
which holds the physician to the standard of care exercised by physicians in the defendant’s own 
community or locality. See Katherine Randall Bowden, Comment, Standard of Care for Medical 
Practitioners—Abandonment of the Locality Rule, 60 KY. L.J. 209, 209–15 (1971); Jon R. Waltz, The Rise and 
Gradual Fall of the Locality Rule in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 18 DEPAUL L. REV. 408 (1969). The 
locality rule developed as a method for evaluating the applicable standard of care by taking into 
account the variety of resource conditions that existed within different communities. E. Haavi 
Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical Care, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1719, 1729 (1987). 
However, the rationale for the locality rule has continued to erode over the past several decades as a 
result of advances in technology, standardized curricula in medical schools, required physician 
certification, and increased access to technology and resources. Id. at 1730. 
42. See, e.g., Schneider v. Revici, 817 F.2d 987, 990 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[T]he issue in medical 
malpractice is not whether a particular treatment is effective but whether that treatment is a deviation 
from accepted medical practice in the community.”). 
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standard “may create perverse incentives that have little to do with preventing or 
compensating medical injuries, and far more to do with physicians’ perceptions 
about the potential risks to themselves associated with medical innovation.”43 To 
understand the potential for perverse incentives, one must evaluate the costs and 
benefits associated with new technology, and how new technology adoption 
operates generally.44 The cost of developing and obtaining new medical 
technology is often astronomical. Such costs are necessarily balanced or 
outweighed by a set of clinical benefits if the technology is to remain marketable. 
For instance, the new technology may confer therapeutic benefits that are 
otherwise unavailable, or function as a risk-superior alternative to existing 
treatments. Thus, a new technology that is more effective compared to the status 
quo might result in a range of long-term social welfare benefits, including reduced 
mortality risks, improved patient outcomes, and lower health-care utilization and 
costs.45 
But the danger posed by a custom-based standard of care is that it escalates 
the risks and costs associated with adopting new technology, apart from any 
underlying clinical risks associated with the technology itself.46 Consequently, 
physicians’ perceptions about elevated malpractice risks would effectively deter 
them from considering new technologies that could otherwise be cost-effective 
and risk-reducing.47 But creating disincentives to innovation certainly cannot be 
the intended purpose of the malpractice doctrine. Rather, the aim of establishing a 
standard of care is to ensure that providers use appropriate prudence and skill in 
delivering medical services, regardless of treatment modality.48 Malpractice law is 
thus charged with maintaining an equitable balance between competing 
interests—on the one hand, the legal regime should encourage providers to 
carefully scrutinize new technology to protect patients against avoidable, 
incremental clinical risks, and to apply any new technology with prudence and 
skill.49 On the other hand, the law should also promote the adoption of new 
technology when it confers broad social benefits that go beyond those that accrue 
directly to patients.50 While it is important to have laws that force physicians to 
carefully assess the risks and benefits of new technology prior to adopting it, we 
do not want to create a regime that effectively prevents the standard of care from 
evolving. Consequently, a custom-based standard of care arguably creates 
potential disincentives to adopting new medical technology that are neither 
intended nor socially desirable. 
Fortunately, judicial deference to physician customs has been gradually 
 
43. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 440. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See id. at 441. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 442. 
50. Id. 
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eroding over the past several decades.51 A quarter of the states have expressly 
rejected deference to medical customary norms.52 Nine additional states, although 
not directly addressing the role of custom, have rephrased the malpractice 
standard of care in terms of what a reasonable physician would do, rather than 
what is customarily done.53 The “reasonable physician” standard of care is the 
same test employed by the states that have expressly rejected a custom-based 
standard of care. Instead of focusing on what is customarily done, the reasonable 
physician standard concentrates on what is “reasonable to expect of a professional 
given the state of medical knowledge at the time of the treatment in issue.”54 The 
differences between the reasonable physician standard and the custom-based 
standard may be subtle at times because, in most instances, the customary 
practices of most physicians correspond closely to an objective standard of 
reasonableness based on the current state of the art in medicine.55 But unlike a 
custom-based standard, adherence to customary practices does not categorically 
immunize a physician from malpractice liability. The reasonable physician standard 
also involves examining the expertise of the physician, the health of the patient, 
the state of medical knowledge, the risks and benefits of the recommended 
treatment, and other patient-specific factors that may have influenced the choice 
of treatment.56 Thus, in principle, the objective “reasonable physician” standard 
gives courts more latitude in reviewing medical knowledge and customs, and in 
deciding what the malpractice standard of care should be in a given situation. 
Moreover, jurisdictions that ostensibly endorse custom actually apply the 
custom-based standard of care in a way that operates very much like a reasonable 
physician standard.57 Courts that theoretically continue to defer to custom have 
created several subsidiary doctrines that attempt to set limits on a custom-based 
standard of care.58 These doctrines include (a) an iteration of an “acceptable 
alternatives” rule, including the “two schools of thought” or “respectable 
minority” rule, which establishes that the standard of care in medicine is not 
unitary, and that there are myriad situations where several forms of medical 
treatment may be consistent with reasonable care;59 (b) the best judgment rule, 
 
51. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 170–85. 
52. Id. at 172–79. 
53. Id. at 180–85. 
54. Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. 
Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001). See generally Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 180–85. 
55. See Richard A. Epstein, The Path to The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the 
Law of Tort, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–6 (1992). See generally Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 188–90. 
56. J. Brad Kallmyer, Note, A Chimera in Every Sense: Standard of Care for Physicians Practicing 
Complementary and Alternative Medicine, 2 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 225, 257 (2005). 
57. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 185–88. 
58. Id. at 170. 
59. See, e.g., Hirahara v. Tanaka, 959 P.2d 830, 834 (Haw. 1998) (“It is not negligent for a 
physician, based on the knowledge that he reasonably possesses at the time, to select a particular 
course of treatment among acceptable medical alternatives.”); Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82, 87 
(Me. 1974) (“[A] physician does not incur liability merely by electing to pursue one of several 
recognized courses of treatment.” (citation omitted)). 
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which requires physicians with unique information to use it regardless of 
customary norms;60 and (c) the common knowledge rule, which permits plaintiffs’ 
verdicts despite evidence that physicians complied with customary standards.61 
Another observation worth noting is that courts within these custom-based 
jurisdictions frequently fail to enforce the standard of care by not requiring 
plaintiffs’ experts to prove that a prevailing custom existed, and that the defendant 
deviated from the custom.62 This tendency toward loose application of the 
custom-based standard of care may be partially attributable to the significant 
obstacles to proving the existence of a prevailing customary norm. First, courts 
have retreated from reliance on local customs in favor of a standard based on 
similar localities or a national standard.63 But medical customs vary widely from 
one geographic community to another,64 and given these variations in physician 
practice patterns across the country, the notion of a national custom seems less 
than realistic. Second, variability in patient pools, illnesses, and possible 
therapeutic responses,65 as well as the economic stratification of patients, act as 
barriers to the formation of stable customs.66 Finally, even when a widely favored 
practice actually exists, ascertaining that custom at a reasonable cost may be 
impossible.67 In the real world of malpractice litigation, expert witnesses base their 
opinions on their experience and the readily available medical literature, but 
 
60. E.g., Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 373 (N.Y. 1968) (finding 
negligence notwithstanding a physician’s adherence to customary practice where defendant’s choice 
among the available alternatives was unreasonable in light of contrary data); Burton v. Brooklyn 
Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982) (same). 
61. See, e.g., Ault v. Hall, 164 N.E. 518, 522–23 (Ohio 1928) (permitting the sponge count 
issue to reach the jury despite evidence that the physician complied with custom); 1 BARRY R. 
FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 6-2, at 368 (1995) (describing common knowledge exception). 
62. E.g., McGrady v. Wright, 729 P.2d 338, 341 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986) (permitting plaintiff to 
reach the jury with testimony that the defendant’s conduct was not “reasonable”); Sanders v. Ramo, 
416 S.E.2d 333, 335 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (accepting plaintiff’s expert testimony that merely stated that 
the defendant “departed from reasonable standards of surgical care”); Hiers v. Lemley, 834 S.W.2d 
729, 733 (Mo. 1992) (accepting testimony about defendant’s “failure to exercise that degree of skill 
and learning that an ordinarily careful and prudent physician would have exercised”). 
63. E.g., Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1952); Tallbull v. Whitney, 564 P.2d 162 
(Mont. 1977), abrogated by Chapel v. Allison, 785 P.2d 204 (Mont. 1990); Cavallaro v. Sharp, 121 A.2d 
669 (R.I. 1956); see, e.g., WILLIAM J. CURRAN ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 343–44 (5th 
ed. 1998) (discussing loosening of locality rule); 1 FURROW ET AL., supra note 61, § 6-2, at 360 (stating 
national standard is majority rule). 
64. See Jack E. Wennberg, Improving the Medical Decision-Making Process, 7 HEALTH AFF. 99, 99 
(1988). 
65. See MARK A. HALL, MAKING MEDICAL SPENDING DECISIONS 84–88 (1997) 
(commenting on the complex and patient-specific nature of individual treatment decisions); James A. 
Henderson, Jr. & John A. Siliciano, Universal Health Care and the Continued Reliance on Custom in 
Determining Medical Malpractice, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1382, 1390 (1994) (concluding that “highly 
differentiated nature of medical problems” hinders the formation of stable medical customs); Alan H. 
McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549, 584 (1959) (explaining that 
“there is no standard patient”). 
66. See Henderson, Jr. & Siliciano, supra note 65, at 1393–94 (“[E]conomic stratification of the 
patient population precludes formation of a stable unitary custom.”). 
67. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 187. 
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typically do not know the actual percentage of physicians who would act as the 
defendant did under the specific circumstances. Thus, one plausible explanation 
for the lack of strict enforcement of the custom-based standard of care is that 
courts are aware of the obstacles to obtaining proof of deviation from an 
established custom.68 
Courts are always cognizant of their role in altering tort law to reflect societal 
change. Indeed, it is the judicial system’s responsibility “to modernize traditional 
principles of tort law when such becomes necessary ‘to ensure that the law 
remains both fair and realistic as society and technology change.’”69 Public 
deference to the judgment of medical professionals has gradually declined in the 
past sixty years.70 One possible explanation for this phenomenon is increased 
patient awareness of medical error, which is not unexpected given the pervasive 
nature of contemporary media.71 As the general level of education and public 
awareness of health issues continue to grow, patients tend to be more 
knowledgeable and to seek more autonomy with respect to medical decision 
making.72 Courts are also more reluctant to trust physicians to regulate themselves, 
and have transitioned away from the belief that physicians are sufficiently different 
from engineers, product manufacturers, and other businesses to justify the special 
privileges previously accorded to physicians.73 Indeed, the creation of common 
law doctrines, including (a) the duty to stay abreast, which obligates physicians to 
be aware of evolving practices in medical care and make appropriate use of new 
scientific knowledge as it emerges;74 (b) the duty to inform the patient of 
appropriate alternative treatments under the informed consent doctrine;75 and (c) 
experimental protocol cases that permit patients to consent to noncustomary 
 
68. Id. 
69. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d 275, 284 (Fla. 1990) (quoting Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. 
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984), abrogated by Ridley v. Safety Kleen Corp., 693 So. 2d 934 
(1996)); see also Schmitz v. Smentowski, 785 P.2d 726, 736 (N.M. 1990) (“[Our State] has recognized 
that tort law is not static—it must expand to recognize changing circumstances that our evolving 
society brings to our attention.”). 
70. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 196. 
71. See, e.g., Robert J. Blendon et al., Patient Safety: Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public 
on Medical Errors, 347 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1933 (2002) (noting the fact that surveys indicated that half 
of the American public followed media coverage of a recent report by the Institute of Medicine, 
entitled To Err Is Human, which concluded that more Americans die as a result of medical errors made 
in hospitals than as a result of injuries from automobile accidents); Preventing Medication Errors, INST. 
MED. ( July 20, 2006), http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2006/Preventing-
Medication-Errors-Quality-Chasm-Series/medicationerrorsnew.pdf; To Err is Human: Building a Safer 
Health System, INST. MED. (Nov. 1, 1999), http://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report 
%20Files/1999/To-Err-is-Human/To%20Err%20is%20Human%201999%20%20report%20brief.pdf. 
72. Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician’s Duty to Inform of Newly Developed Therapy, 6 J. CONTEMP. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 46 (1990). 
73. Peters, Jr., supra note 37, at 192, 199–200. 
74. See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982); 
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins. 
Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001); Williams, supra note 38, at 508–12. 
75. Smith v. Karen S. Reisig, M.D., Inc., 686 P.2d 285, 288–89 (Okla. 1984); Keogan v. Holy 
Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1252–53 (Wash. 1980). 
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experimental treatments76 appear to be a judicial response to the public’s declining 
trust in health-care providers and represent a further shift towards replacing the 
traditional custom-based standard of care. 
B. The Physician’s Duty to Stay Abreast 
One element of the standard of care for medical malpractice is that a 
physician has the duty to keep reasonably abreast of the latest advances in medical 
science.77 However, the exact scope of this common law doctrine and its 
implications on medical malpractice liability remain unclear. This section describes 
the evolution of the duty to stay abreast, highlights the failure of courts to define 
the exact scope of this heavily recited doctrine, and concludes with this Note’s 
stance on how this duty should be interpreted. 
Courts began asserting the duty to stay abreast as early as the mid-nineteenth 
century.78 Although courts do not require physicians “to possess extraordinary 
knowledge and ability that belongs to a few . . . [courts may require them] ‘to keep 
abreast of the times and to practice in accordance with the approved methods and 
means of treatment in general use.’”79 While the duty to stay abreast typically 
manifests itself as qualifying language within a custom-based standard of care,80 
 
76. E.g., Karp v. Cooley, 493 F.2d 408, 423–24 (5th Cir. 1974) (reasoning that patient’s 
informed consent precludes physician liability for an experimental procedure). 
77. Reed v. Church, 8 S.E.2d 285, 288 (Va. 1940) (holding that physician was liable for 
causing plaintiff’s injury because the physician had easy access to information that clearly warned 
against continued drug treatment if vision problems arose); R. CRAWFORD MORRIS & ALAN R. 
MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 331 (5th ed. 1971). 
78. E.g., McCandless v. McWha, 22 Pa. 261 (Pa. 1853). 
[I]n a given case, regard is to be had to the advanced state of the profession at the time. 
Discoveries in the natural sciences for the last half-century have exerted a sensible 
influence on all the learned professions, but especially on that of medicine, whose circle of 
truths has been relatively much enlarged. And besides, there has been a positive progress in 
that profession resulting from the studies, the experiments, and the diversified practice of 
its professors. The patient is entitled to the benefit of these increased lights. The physician or surgeon who 
assumes to exercise the healing art, is bound to be up to the improvements of the day. The standard of 
ordinary skill is on the advance; and he who would not be found wanting, must apply 
himself with all diligence to the most accredited sources of knowledge. 
Id. at 269 (emphasis added). 
79. Williams, supra note 38, at 508–09 (quoting Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760 (N.Y. 
1898)); see also Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 13 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Poysner v. United States, 
602 F. Supp. 436, 438–39 (D. Mass. 1984)) (applying Massachusetts law and stating that “[a] physician 
is held to the standard of care and skill of the average practitioner of the medical specialty in question, 
taking into account the advances in the profession” (citation omitted)); Ward v. United States, 838 
F.2d 182, 187 (6th Cir. 1988) (citing Ogle v. Noe, 6 Tenn. App. 485 (1927)) (applying Tennessee law 
and stating, “In determining the degree of learning and skill required of a medical practitioner in the 
treatment of a particular case, regard must be given to the state of medical science at the time.”). 
80. Examples of such language include “taking into account,” “having regard to,” or “in light 
of” advances in medical science. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Goldstein, 508 N.E.2d 97, 99 (Mass. 
1987) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (“A doctor undertakes to use a reasonable degree of care 
such as ordinarily possessed by others providing medical care and treatment, having regard to the 
current state of care and treatment.”); Dietsch v. Mayberry, 47 N.E.2d 404, 409 (Ohio Ct. App. 1942) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (recognizing physician’s duty “to exercise the average degree of 
           
2014] PERFECTING PREGNANCY 1309 
several courts have been more explicit in their pronouncement that physicians 
have a legal obligation to keep abreast of medical advances.81 
Several court decisions have directly confronted the issue of whether a 
physician can escape liability by strictly adhering to medical custom without 
considering the adequacy of such custom in light of current medical advances.82 In 
Nowatske v. Osterloh, a plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against his physician for 
injuries that arose after the defendant performed a scleral buckling procedure to 
reattach the patient’s retina.83 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the lower court’s 
jury instruction was defective because it equated the legal standard of care with the 
medical customary practice without taking current medical advances into 
account.84 The plaintiff argued that failure to consider the custom in light of 
current science would allow an unreasonable and outdated custom to shield clearly 
negligent conduct from malpractice liability.85 In its analysis, the Nowatske court 
cited Gates v. Fleisher for the proposition that the current state of medical science is 
a relevant factor in the standard of care.86 The Nowatske court reasoned that 
“should customary medical practice fail to keep pace with developments and 
advances in medical science, adherence to custom might constitute a failure to 
exercise reasonable care.”87 The court then concluded that the instruction was 
sufficient because the language “due regard for the state of medical science” 
accurately informed the jury that the competent physician is one who keeps 
abreast of current medical advances.88 
The case law makes clear that the duty to keep abreast only extends to 
medical information known or available at the time of treatment.89 For instance, in 
 
skill, care, and diligence exercised by members of the same profession . . . in the light of the present 
state of medical and surgical science”).  
81. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982); 
Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 265, 273 (Wis. 1996) (“[A] reasonably competent practitioner is 
one who keeps up with advances in medical knowledge.”), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins. 
Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001). 
82. Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968) (finding that where a 
physician fails to employ his best judgment, he is not immunized from liability because he followed 
customary practice); Burton, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 879–80 (finding that although conventional medical 
wisdom was that increased oxygen was essential to the survival of premature infants, defendants were 
not relieved of liability when they were clearly aware of the dangers of following the customary 
practice); Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974) (holding that custom is never dispositive of 
reasonableness where custom itself is lagging behind an established, cost-effective, and scientifically 
reliable trend); Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 272 (finding that the standard of care owed by physicians 
cannot be established by the sum of the customs which those practitioners follow). 
83. Nowatske, 543 N.W.2d at 266. 
84. Id. at 269–70. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 271 (citing Gates v. Fleischer, 30 N.W. 674, 675 (Wis. 1886)). 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 273. 
89. McBride v. Saylin, 56 P.2d 941, 941 (Cal. 1936) (stating that a physician’s malpractice 
liability depends on whether “the treatment given by the defendant [was] consistent with that 
reasonable degree of learning and skill usually possessed and rendered by others of his 
profession . . . having regard to the state of scientific learning at the time” (emphasis added)); Tomer v. Am. 
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Mallet v. Pirkey, a patient brought a malpractice suit against a physician for injuries 
suffered as a result of a prescribed drug’s side effects.90 The court held that the 
physician was not liable as a matter of law for the drug’s side effects where “[t]he 
medical literature did not reveal any serious complication in its use.”91 In contrast, 
the court in Reed v. Church found the defendant physician liable for injuries that 
were sustained as a result of a recommended drug treatment92 because the 
physician had in his possession pamphlets from the drug manufacturer that listed 
blindness as a possible side effect and described the symptoms of its onset.93 
Unlike Mallet, the physician in Reed had easy access to medical information that 
clearly warned against continued use of the drug if vision problems arose.94 Mallet 
and Reed thus define a spectrum in which physicians are held accountable to know 
information to which they had reasonable access at the time of the treatment. 
Although many cases recite the duty to stay abreast, courts have rarely 
addressed what exactly this duty entails.95 Physicians are largely uninformed as to 
what it means to “stay abreast” because the current doctrine only defines the duty 
in vague terms. The scope of the doctrine is also unclear because courts originally 
articulated the duty to stay abreast when medical knowledge progressed at a much 
slower pace and staying abreast involved significantly less effort than it does 
today.96 But this lack of clarity does not necessarily mean that “the duty to stay 
abreast should fall in the face of rapid advances in medical science,” because “such 
a paradox would belie the policy that led to the rule in the first place.”97 Instead, 
the definition of what it means to stay abreast needs to be fleshed out so as to 
instruct physicians on how to avoid liability in light of the nontrivial task of 
staying abreast with the fast-paced advances in modern medicine.98 
Indeed, current legal scholarship reflects the significant confusion over the 
scope of the duty to stay abreast. Some scholars construe the duty to stay abreast 
as “a duty to keep abreast of customary medical practice,”99 whereas others believe that 
the duty to stay abreast effectively demands “adherence to the state-of-the-art 
 
Home Prods. Corp., 368 A.2d 35, 38 (Conn. 1976) (“[T]he standard of care which was applicable to 
the doctors in the use of Halothane was dependent upon the state of their art at the time that they were 
allegedly negligent.” (emphasis added)); King v. Ditto, 19 P.2d 1100, 1102 (Or. 1933) (“As a general 
rule, the degree of care and skill depends somewhat upon . . . the advanced state of medical and surgical 
science at the time services to patient were rendered. . . . What might have been considered due care twenty 
years ago would be gross negligence to-day.” (emphasis added)). 
90. Mallet v. Pirkey, 466 P.2d 466, 468 (Colo. 1970). 
91. Id. at 470. 
92. Reed v. Church, 8 S.E.2d 285, 287 (Va. 1940). 
93. Id. at 290. 
94. Id. 
95. For examples of formulations of the duty to stay abreast, see supra note 89. 
96. Williams, supra note 38, at 513. 
97. Id. at 514. 
98. Id. 
99. Kacmar, supra note 37, at 641. 
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rather than simply [abiding by] existing custom.”100 This Note takes a more 
conservative stance than the latter viewpoint and contends that, at minimum, “the 
duty to stay abreast” entails more than keeping up with customary medical 
practice101 because adhering to a custom-based standard may actually serve to 
entrench poor or harmful customs into mainstream practice,102 which is contrary 
to the doctrine’s intended purpose (i.e., permitting the standard of care to evolve 
in response to medical advances). Moreover, the scope of the duty to stay abreast 
must align with the “best judgment” rule, a parallel common law doctrine that 
expressly permits departure from customary practices in the event that a physician 
becomes aware of new medical information that impacts treatment decisions. For 
example, in Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, the court considered whether the 
defendants, a physician and a hospital, were liable for injuries the plaintiff incurred 
due to prolonged oxygen exposure following the plaintiff’s premature birth.103 The 
defendants argued that they should be insulated from liability because they acted 
in accordance with conventional medical wisdom that considered increased 
oxygen essential to the survival of premature babies.104 The Burton court imposed 
liability because the defendants were clearly aware of the dangers of administrating 
excess oxygen to premature babies at the time of treatment based on several 
research studies, including their own.105 The Burton court effectively held that the 
defendants were liable for failing to keep up with the latest medical advances and 
failing to exercise sound medical judgment when they were aware of the dangers 
of a generally accepted customary practice.106 The duty to stay abreast is thus 
tightly intertwined with the “best judgment” rule, which requires a physician to 
employ his expertise, or best judgment, when he acquires new, relevant medical 
information, regardless of existing customary practices. 
Awareness of medical information thus impacts both treatment decisions 
 
100. Lars Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the 
Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 463 (2002). 
101. A comparison to how other professionals view the duty to stay abreast might be useful in 
ascertaining what exactly this duty entails for medical practitioners. For instance, attorneys appear to 
be held to a more pronounced duty to stay abreast in that they face a higher risk of liability if they do 
not keep up with the latest changes in the law. See Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect 
of the Information Age on Physicians’ Professional Liability, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 69, 92 (1986) (stating that 
failure to Shepardize is a way in which “an attorney’s failure to keep abreast in law can easily result in 
malpractice liability”); see also Fiorentino v. Rapoport, 693 A.2d 208, 213 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (stating 
that the court does not expect the attorney “to be infallible,” but does expect him to conduct that 
degree of research sufficient to enable the client “to make an informed decision”). Courts have 
explained that attorneys have a duty to not only know “plain and elementary principles of law which 
are commonly known by well-informed attorneys,” but must also “discover those additional rules of 
law which, although not commonly known, may readily be found by standard research techniques.” 
Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (Cal. 1975). Thus in the context of the law of legal malpractice, the 
duty to stay abreast goes beyond keeping up with customary norms within the profession. 
102. See Kacmar, supra note 37, at 642–43. 
103. Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 1982). 
104. Id. at 879–80. 
105. Id. 
106. Id.; see also Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368, 372–73 (N.Y. 1968). 
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and the applicable standard of care. Advances in information technology over the 
past two decades provide physicians with rapid access to cutting-edge medical 
research, allowing them to evaluate diagnostic and treatment decisions against 
broader background information. Consequently, the scope of the physician’s duty 
to stay abreast will continue to evolve as breakthroughs in information 
dissemination and medical science occur. 
C. Clinical Practice Guidelines:  
An Incomplete Solution to Defining the Standard of Care 
Applying rapid advances in fields such as cell biology, genomics, 
immunology, and pharmacology to medical practice poses a dual challenge. On 
one hand, new scientific information reported in the literature fails to efficiently 
translate into new practice styles.107 Conversely, there are concerns that expensive, 
new technology may be adopted uncritically before its efficacy is adequately 
assessed.108 Because of this apparent lack of coordination between technology 
assessment and clinical practice,109 and the lack of consensus as to what the best 
methods and treatments are,110 various medical professional societies have 
promulgated CPGs to evaluate the efficacy of various medical practices.111 CPGs 
are “systematically developed statements to assist practitioner and patient 
decisions about appropriate health care for specific clinical circumstances.”112 In 
addition to coordinating technology assessment and clinical practice,113 and 
 
107. Ann Lennarson Greer, The State of the Art Versus the State of the Science: The Diffusion of New 
Medical Technologies into Practice, 4 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 5, 5 (1988) (describing 
physician skepticism of new procedures and reliance upon tradition); Edward J. Huth, The Underused 
Medical Literature, 110 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 99, 99 (1989) (citing “time and effort” involved in 
obtaining information from the literature as the primary barrier to incorporation into practice). 
108. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, ASSESSING THE EFFICACY AND SAFETY OF MEDICAL 
TECHNOLOGIES 93–94 (1978); Greer, supra note 107, at 5–6 (“Technologies believed to be 
efficacious are often very slow in achieving an impact, while technologies of questionable value 
diffuse rapidly . . . .”). 
109. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 108, at 89–90. 
110. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 12 
(6th ed. 2008) (“Although there are generally accepted treatments for many diseases, and doctors can 
agree that there has been bad care in some cases, for many others there are no generally agreed 
standards of what is ‘the best’ care.”). 
111. See, e.g., J. Sanford Schwartz et al., Safety, Efficacy, and Effectiveness of Clinical Practices: A New 
Initiative, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 246 (1982); Practice Committee Documents, AM. SOC’Y FOR 
REPROD. MED. (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.asrm.org/Guidelines; Clinical Practice Guidelines, NAT’L 
HEART, LUNG, & BLOOD INST. (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.nhlbi.nih.gov/health-pro/guidelines. 
Scholars estimate the number of CPGs currently in existence to range from 1600 to 2000. See 
Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice 
Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 685 (2001) (noting that more than 1600 guidelines exist); Noah, 
supra note 100, at 418 (“More than 2000 guidelines exist today.”). 
112. INST. OF MED., GUIDELINES FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO 
USE 27 (Marilyn J. Field & Kathleen N. Lohr eds., 1992). 
113. See Richard E. Leahy, Rational Health Policy and the Legal Standard of Care: A Call for Judicial 
Deference to Medical Practice Guidelines, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1483, 1488–89 (1989) (explaining development 
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expressing a consensus on the best practices,114 CPGs help counter the 
information explosion in medicine115 by providing a necessary abridgement of the 
scientific literature116 and reflecting the judgments of leaders in the medical 
community.117 CPGs have also been used as barometers for establishing 
conventional standards of care in some jurisdictions.118 
However, the use of CPGs to define the appropriate standard of care is not 
without its criticisms. First, many physicians construe CPGs as an impediment to 
exercising independent clinical judgment,119 especially when there may be more 
than one effective treatment in a given instance.120 Physicians may feel unduly 
compelled to adhere to CPGs, even if the guidelines conflict with a physician’s 
best judgment, because of underlying liability concerns that could potentially lead 
to adverse patient outcomes.121 Second, many CPGs are vague and based on 
generalities, thus providing limited assistance for diagnosing or treating a particular 
patient.122 Third, significant credibility problems may also arise where the 
recommended guidelines are biased by the self-interests of the standard-setting 
organizations.123 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, CPGs will invariably lag 
 
and endorsement of practice guidelines as response to “apparent lack of coordination between 
technology assessment and clinical practice”). 
114. See Williams, supra note 38, at 489 n.53 (noting that CPGs can help “articulate consensus 
on acceptable practice” and “disseminate information on the consensus” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
115. See Leahy, supra note 113, at 1487–91 (explaining how explosion of medical information 
necessitates CPGs). 
116. See Noah, supra note 100, at 418 (“If nothing else, practice guidelines provide a handy 
abridgement of the burgeoning biomedical literature.”). 
117. Id. (“[CPGs] also serve a signaling function, reflecting the judgments of leading experts in 
the field”). 
118. See Linda L. LeCraw, Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 3 J. 
ONCOLOGY PRAC. 254 (2007); Timothy K. Mackey & Bryan A. Liang, The Role of Practice Guidelines in 
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 13 VIRTUAL MENTOR 36, 37–38 (2011). The use of CPGs as exculpatory 
evidence of malpractice has been given special scrutiny due to its use in Maine’s Medical Liability 
Demonstration Project in the 1990s. Mello, supra note 111, at 674–77. Under the reform, physicians 
who complied with the twenty state-adopted CPGs were provided an affirmative defense against 
medical malpractice claims. Id. at 675. Unfortunately, the project did not show significant reductions 
in defensive medicine practices or in malpractice claims, and the law’s provisions had low utilization 
in court. Id. at 676. 
119. INST. OF MED., supra note 112, at 24 (“[M]any physicians, especially those longer in 
practice, see guidelines as a challenge to clinical judgment and resist them as a threat to the most 
fundamental element of professional autonomy.”). 
120. See Williams, supra note 38, at 491 n.65 (“Substantial regional variations exist in the use of 
many procedures, with no apparent differences in outcome.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
121. Mackey & Liang, supra note 118, at 39. 
122. See E. Haavi Morreim, Commentary, From the Clinics to the Courts: The Role Evidence Should 
Play in Litigating Medical Care, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 409, 422 (2001) (“[E]ven the best CPGs 
cannot possibly dictate each patient’s course of care. They are based on generalities that hold true on 
average, but have only limited room to accommodate the natural variations among individuals in any 
population.”). 
123. See Noah, supra note 100, at 422 (“When specialty medical societies sponsor clinical 
practice guidelines, the financial interests of their members may influence the resolution of contested 
issues.”). 
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behind current advances in medical science because professional associations can 
take years to formulate and codify guidelines.124 CPGs cannot always reflect the 
current best evidence. “Even if a guideline reflects current best evidence when 
written, medical advances could soon render such a guideline obsolete.”125 
“[G]uidelines may [thus] have the effect of freezing the standard of care, thereby 
discouraging further research and innovation in areas [where] the experts have 
reached a consensus.”126 This inherent lack of dynamism perpetuates 
inconsistencies within the standard of care analysis for emerging technologies, 
thereby weighing against a legal framework that is solely based on CPGs. 
Given the problems associated with the CPG standard, it would be unwise 
for courts to demand lockstep adherence to any given CPG.127 Instead, an optimal 
standard of care is one that encourages physicians to keep informed of current 
medical knowledge and practice accordingly. This is not to say that CPGs lack 
any significance. Rather, physicians should not only be aware of CPG 
recommendations, but also of how other evidence alters those 
recommendations.128 In other words, while CPGs can reflect current best 
evidence at the time that they are promulgated, subsequent advances in medical 
science may interpret, refine, or overturn them.129 Thus, while CPGs remain a 
significant factor in the standard of care analysis, they are not dispositive of a 
physician’s liability for malpractice. 
D. Informed Consent: The Duty to Inform of Alternative Treatments 
The doctrine of informed consent is part of the general evolution of 
attitudes about the doctor-patient relationship, including “the growing belief that 
patients are entitled to more information about their health, as well as a real and 
informed role in decisions about their medical treatment.”130 One aspect of the 
informed consent doctrine is the duty to inform the patient of appropriate 
alternative treatments.131 To prove a medical malpractice claim due to negligent 
nondisclosure of an alternative treatment plan, the plaintiff must establish: (a) a 
duty on the part of the physician to know of an alternative treatment,132 and (b) a 
duty to disclose the alternative treatment plan “by evidence establishing that a 
reasonable person in what the physician knows or should have known to be the 
patient’s position would likely attach significance to that . . . alternative in 
 
124. See Mark Kadzielski et al., Peer Review and Practice Guidelines Under Health Care Reform, 16 
WHITTIER L. REV. 157, 176 (1995) (identifying the concern that CPGs will be outdated before 
adopted). 
125. Williams, supra note 38, at 487–88. 
126. Noah, supra note 100, at 425. 
127. Morreim, supra note 122, at 422. 
128. Williams, supra note 38, at 525–26. 
129. Id. 
130. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 46. 
131. Id. 
132. This duty parallels the duty to stay abreast described infra in Part II.B. 
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formulating his decision to consent to treatment.”133 Unlike a typical medical 
malpractice claim, the injury sustained under an informed consent claim is not 
necessarily an injury resulting from negligent medical treatment.134 The critical 
factor is whether the injury would have been avoided if the plaintiff had chosen an 
undisclosed alternative treatment. 
Courts adopt one of two approaches to the duty to obtain informed consent. 
Some jurisdictions apply a “professional” standard of informed consent, which 
requires a physician to inform the patient of alternatives to the recommended 
medical treatment as would other physicians practicing in the community.135 Thus, 
under the professional standard, the defendant physician’s conduct is measured in 
relation to the level of care given by other practitioners in the relevant community. 
Other states apply the “lay” standard of informed consent, where the physician 
has a duty to inform the patient of all the information a reasonable patient would 
wish to know in making an informed decision as to whether to undergo the 
proposed treatment.136 Thus, the driving force behind the lay standard is 
protecting the patient’s rights of self-determination and bodily autonomy. 
Under either the professional or lay approach to informed consent, the 
physician has the duty to inform the patient of appropriate alternative treatments, 
and to describe the risks and benefits of those treatments.137 Of course, this duty 
does not require a physician to disclose every possible alternative to every detail of 
the proposed treatment. Rather, the physician must engage in a dialogue that 
“involves choosing among medically acceptable options, not simply accepting or 
rejecting the medically preferable option.”138 For instance, in Keogan v. Holy Family 
Hospital, a physician gave a resting electrocardiogram (EKG) to a thirty-seven-
year-old patient with chest pain, but did not inform him of a treadmill EKG or an 
angiography as medically acceptable options.139 The court held that the physician 
had a duty to disclose alternative diagnostic procedures once he had knowledge of 
a physical abnormality in the patient, and that the physician was negligent as a 
matter of law for his failure to disclose the alternative diagnostic procedures.140 
Thus, the duty to inform patients of alternative treatments has a profound effect 
 
133. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 44 (quoting Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 295 N.W.2d 638, 640 
(Minn. 1980)). 
134. In fact, the injury may even be a fully expected outcome of the recommended medical 
treatment. 
135. E.g., Ziegert v. S. Chi. Cmty. Hosp., 425 N.E.2d 450 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). 
136. E.g., Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987). Some courts apply an objective 
test, which requires a showing that a reasonable person would have made a different choice if 
informed of the alternative. Duff v. Yelin, 721 S.W.2d 365, 372 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d, 751 S.W.2d 
175 (Tex. 1988). Whereas other courts require the patient to prove subjectively that disclosure of the 
alternative would have altered her decision to consent to the proposed treatment. Spencer v. Seikel, 
742 P.2d 1126, 1129 (Okla. 1987). 
137. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 46–47. 
138. APPELBAUM ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 
54 (1987) (emphasis added). 
139. Keogan v. Holy Family Hosp., 622 P.2d 1246, 1249 (Wash. 1980). 
140. Id. at 1252–53. 
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on the doctor-patient relationship because it effectively obligates the physician to 
defend her choice of treatment, compared to other medically acceptable 
alternatives, to the patient.141 The rule goes beyond ensuring that the patient is 
made aware of the dangers of the recommended treatment and effectively reserves 
a role for the patient in the clinical decision-making process.142 
The case law makes clear that the touchstone for determining whether an 
alternative treatment must be disclosed is that the treatment be “medically 
acceptable.” Thus, courts are confronted with the task of defining (a) what makes 
a particular treatment, especially a new one, acceptable; and (b) to whom it must 
be acceptable. To this end, scholars have enumerated several criteria to evaluate 
when a new treatment becomes sufficiently “acceptable” to trigger the duty to 
disclose.143 These criteria include (a) approval of a drug or device by the FDA for 
a particular indication, (b) official acceptance of a new medical treatment by a 
professional medical society,144 (c) whether the effectiveness of the new treatment 
has been demonstrated through articles in peer-reviewed medical journals or 
leading textbooks of the relevant specialty,145 (d) whether the new treatment is 
accepted as appropriate by a substantial percentage (or respectable minority) of 
practitioners in the relevant specialty, and (e) whether the physician has individual 
knowledge of a new treatment. All of the enumerated factors potentially could be 
used by experts in formulating their opinions as to whether the practitioner was 
reasonable in her assessment of whether the alternative treatment was medically 
acceptable. 
Some courts, including those applying the lay standard of informed consent, 
have implicitly recognized that the standard for “medical acceptability” should be 
based on the perceptions of the reasonable practitioner.146 Thus, the relevant 
 
141. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 47. 
142. Some courts believe that improved access to information may broaden the physician’s 
duty of informed consent. Harnish v. Children’s Hosp. Med. Ctr., 439 N.E.2d 240, 243 (Mass. 1982) 
(stating that a doctor must “disclose in a reasonable manner all significant medical information that 
the physician possesses or reasonably should possess that is material to an intelligent decision by the 
patient whether to undergo a proposed procedure” (emphasis added)). 
143. Prillaman, supra note 72, at 53–57. 
144. However, this approach would lead to a conflict between the patients’ interests and the 
professional organization’s interest in protecting its own members. It would also exclude 
recommended treatments by reputable groups dissenting from the professional society’s view. 
145. There are several caveats with the leading textbook approach. It is practically impossible 
to keep textbooks up to date given the rapidly changing realm of modern medical science. No leading, 
general textbook is updated on more than a yearly basis and many specialty textbooks are updated far 
less frequently. 
146. See, e.g., Steele v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 371 So. 2d 843, 849 (La. Ct. App. 1979), 
cert. denied, 374 So. 2d 658 (La. 1979); see also Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (Md. 1977); Getchell 
v. Mansfield, 489 P.2d 953, 957 (Or. 1971); Neal v. Lu, 530 A.2d 103, 112 (Pa. Super. 1987). Expert 
testimony is necessary to establish that an alternative treatment is “feasible” but not to establish 
whether it must be disclosed. Miller v. Kennedy, 522 P.2d 852, 861 (Wash. App. 1974) (“There is no 
need to prove what other doctors might tell their patients in similar circumstances.”), aff’d, 530 P.2d 
334 (Wash. 1975), superseded by statute, Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.050 (West 2011), as recognized in 
Stewart-Graves v. Vaughn, 170 P.3d 1151, 1155 (Wash. 2007). 
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inquiry is whether the reasonable physician would believe that the treatment was 
accepted as an appropriate treatment by a substantial percentage of reputable 
experts in the field, rather than whether the individual physician believes that the 
treatment is feasible. Under this standard, a physician could avoid the danger of 
having to disclose treatments that are either suspect or too new to have a track 
record, but would still be obligated to keep up with the relevant literature and 
other sources of information, and to inform patients of new treatments as they 
meet the criteria for medical acceptance. 
III. APPLICATION OF EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO A  
PHYSICIAN’S DUTY TO OFFER AND PROVIDE OPTIMIZED  
PGS-ANEUPLOIDY SCREENING SERVICES 
A. The Inadequacy of a Custom-Based Standard of Care for PGS 
As an initial matter, this Note contends that it is illogical for courts to apply a 
custom-based standard in determining a physician’s standard of care for adopting 
technological advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening. As mentioned earlier, the 
malpractice standard of care is evolutionary because it assumes and depends upon 
changes in medical knowledge and the innovation of new technologies. Because 
emerging technologies differ from traditional modalities of treatment, most 
practitioners have not yet adopted them. Therefore, one consequence of 
maintaining a custom-based standard of care is that physicians may be reluctant to 
incorporate state-of-the-art procedures and devices that offer new or improved 
clinical benefits since, generally, these technologies have not yet been accepted by 
the medical community.147 This dilemma is exacerbated by the fact that there is 
significant lag time between discovery and general acceptance by the profession.148 
Adhering to a custom-based standard of care makes little sense where high-
grade scientific evidence suggests deviating from a customary medical practice that 
is ineffective or poses unnecessary clinical risks to patients. In the context of PGS-
aneuploidy screening, FISH has traditionally been the method of choice used to 
examine chromosomal abnormalities in biopsied material retrieved from cleavage-
stage embryos,149 and various FISH protocols only permit physicians to screen 
five to nine chromosomes per embryo, as opposed to the whole chromosome 
complement.150 Thus, FISH would inherently yield a certain number of false-
negative results because the abnormalities may be present on chromosomes that 
 
147. See Amy Jurevic Sokol & Christopher J. Molzen, The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine, 
23 J. LEGAL MED. 449, 471 (2002). 
148. See id. at 485 (“Acceptance of new practice approaches engendered by new technology 
takes time . . . .”). 
149. Fragouli & Wells, supra note 2, at 290. 
150. E.g., Pere Colls et al., Increased Efficiency of Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis for Infertility Using 
“No Result Rescue,” 88 FERTILITY & STERILITY 53 (2007); A. Mantzouratou et al., Variable Aneuploidy 
Mechanisms in Embryos from Couples with Poor Reproductive Histories Undergoing Preimplantation Genetic 
Screening, 22 HUM. REPROD. 1844 (2007). 
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are not scored. The procedure is further complicated by the fact that cleavage-
stage embryos tend to be mosaic, which can lead to additional errors in 
classification.151 Over the past five years, several randomized clinical trials have 
reported that the use of FISH-based screening methods at the cleavage stage can 
negatively impact the likelihood of establishing a clinical pregnancy.152 Subsequent 
studies demonstrated that comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies 
have superior diagnostic potential on account of their high accuracy and precision 
rates.153 For instance, CGH-based screening detects forty-two percent more 
chromosomal errors in cleavage-stage embryos than the most sensitive FISH-
based protocol,154 and yields significantly lower error rates compared to FISH 
analysis.155 Additionally, improved biopsy procedures are less likely to damage the 
embryos, thereby increasing the likelihood of establishing a clinical pregnancy via 
the preferential transfer of viable, normal embryos. Under these circumstances, a 
physician may reasonably believe that she can serve the patient’s best interests by 
deviating from traditional PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques and employing 
optimized strategies that yield more promising results. But under a custom-based 
standard of care, a physician might not act in accordance with her best judgment 
because she realizes that departure from custom would leave her vulnerable to 
malpractice liability. Indeed, the physician may be inclined to adhere to outdated, 
and often harmful, customary medical practices until the new technologies are 
generally accepted in the profession.156 
 
151. Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 16. 
152. See, e.g., Christophe Blockeel et al., Prospectively Randomized Controlled Trial of PGS in 
IVF/ICSI Patients with Poor Implantation, 17 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 848, 848–54 (2008); 
Sophie Debrock et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening for Aneuploidy of Embryos After In Vitro Fertilization 
in Women Aged at Least 35 Years: A Prospective Randomized Trial, 93 FERTILITY & STERILITY 364, 364–
73 (2010); Hardarson et al., supra note 16, at 2806–12; Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 9–17; 
Jennifer E. Mersereau et al., Preimplantation Genetic Screening to Improve In Vitro Fertilization Pregnancy 
Rates: A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial, 90 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1287, 1287–89 (2008); Liza 
R. Meyer et al., A Prospective Randomized Controlled Trial of Preimplantation Genetic Screening in the “Good 
Prognosis” Patient, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1731, 1731–38 (2009); William B. Schoolcraft et al., 
Preimplantation Aneuploidy Testing for Infertile Patients of Advanced Maternal Age: A Randomized Prospective 
Trial, 92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 157, 157–62 (2009); C. Staessen et al., Preimplantation Genetic 
Screening Does Not Improve Delivery Rate in Women Under the Age of 36 Following Single-Embryo Transfer, 23 
HUM. REPROD. 2818, 2818–25 (2008). 
153. See supra note 30. 
154. Cristina Gutiérrez-Mateo et al., Validation of Microarray Comparative Genomic Hybridization for 
Comprehensive Chromosome Analysis of Embryos, 95 FERTILITY & STERILITY 953, 955 (2011). 
155. Id. at 955 (demonstrating that error rates for optimal CGH protocol were generally lower 
compared with those reported with the use of FISH). 
156. Kacmar, supra note 37, at 621 (“Ordinarily, until the medical community adopts a 
particular procedure, technique, or methodology, a physician is not negligent for failing to discover, 
consider, or adopt it.”). It is possible that physicians practicing in some custom-based jurisdictions 
might find safe harbor under the “respectable minority” or “two schools of thought” rule. But the 
mere existence of this safe harbor might not be enough to persuade physicians to depart from 
customary practices because jurisdictions vary widely in the language used to define the standard. See 
Michael Kowalski, Applying the “Two Schools of Thought” Doctrine to the Repressed Memory Controversy, 19 J. 
LEGAL MED. 503, 505–23 (1998). 
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The status quo of PGS-aneuploidy screening in reproductive medicine 
mirrors the factual circumstances described in Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hospital, 
where the medical-community custom was clearly lagging behind a recognized, 
scientifically reliable trend, and the defendant physician was fully aware of the 
dangers of following the harmful customary practice.157 This is precisely the sort 
of situation where courts have been willing to disregard custom and resolve the 
predicament by judicial fiat.158 A custom-based standard of care is thus 
inappropriate in the context of PGS-aneuploidy screening because it decreases 
physician autonomy with respect to incorporating state-of-the-art procedures, 
hinders the pace of innovation, and perpetuates a substandard level of care that 
can lead to adverse patient outcomes. 
B. A Standard of Care Based Solely on CPGs Is Insufficient 
The ASRM’s existing CPGs on PGS-aneuploidy screening should not serve 
as the sole barometer in evaluating good medical practice. Presently, the ASRM 
offers no guidance on preferred PGS-aneuploidy screening protocols,159 but 
specifies that PGS is an experimental procedure “that should be performed only 
with the specific review of a properly constituted Institutional Review Board.”160 
In fact, blind reliance on the ASRM’s current recommendations against the 
“routine [use of] preimplantation embryo aneuploidy screening” 161 for infertile 
patients is no longer justified because the guidelines no longer reflect the current 
best evidence.162 The ASRM’s existing guidelines were formulated based on 
research studies that used FISH-based screening methods in cleavage-stage 
embryos,163 and the ASRM has yet to issue guidelines that consider recent 
advances in PGS-aneuploidy screening, including CGH, CCS, SNP microarrays, 
and improved embryo biopsy procedures. Additionally, physicians would not be 
fulfilling their fiduciary obligations by merely searching for updates in PGS-
aneuploidy screening practice guidelines because, apart from the most remarkable 
discoveries, there is always a delay before a professional society endorses any 
promising innovative technology.164 This is largely due to the fact that many 
 
157. See Burton v. Brooklyn Doctors Hosp., 452 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879–80 (App. Div. 1982). 
158. See Toth v. Cmty. Hosp. at Glen Cove, 239 N.E.2d 368 (N.Y. 1968); Burton, 452 
N.Y.S.2d at 879–80; Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981 (Wash. 1974); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 543 N.W.2d 
265, 272 (Wis. 1996), abrogated by Nommensen v. Am. Cont’l Ins. Co., 629 N.W.2d 301 (Wis. 2001). 
159. See SART & ASRM, supra note 3; ASRM, supra note 5. 
160. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Definition of “Experimental Procedures,” 
92 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1517, 1517 (2009). 
161. ASRM, supra note 5, at 1105. 
162. Id. 
163. See, e.g., M.T.M. Franssen et al., Reproductive Outcome After PGD in Couples with Recurrent 
Miscarriage Carrying a Structural Chromosome Abnormality: A Systematic Review, 17 HUM. REPROD. UPDATE 
467 (2011); Jennifer Hirshfeld-Cytron et al., Management of Recurrent Pregnancy Loss Associated with a 
Parental Carrier of a Reciprocal Translocation: A Systematic Review, 29 SEMINARS REPROD. MED. 470, 470–
81 (2011). 
164. For example, the ASRM waited almost twenty years before removing the “experimental” 
label from embryo freezing protocols. Fertility Experts Issue New Report on Egg Freezing: ASRM Lifts 
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CPGs, like customary practices, are based on current medical consensus.165 Thus, 
ART physicians should not solely rely on the ASRM’s existing CPGs concerning 
PGS-aneuploidy screening, because doing so may actually compromise the best 
interests of their existing patients. 
C. The “Reasonable Physician” Standard: The Optimal Framework  
for Defining a Physician’s Duty to Adopt Emerging PGS Technologies 
The “reasonable physician” standard is the most suitable approach to 
defining the standard of care owed by ART physicians in the context of providing 
optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening. Usually, the reasonable physician standard is 
informed by reference to what other physicians would do when confronted with 
similar circumstances. But the reasonable physician standard takes on an added 
layer of complexity when the use of a new medical technology is implicated, 
particularly where the technology involves a transformation in related procedures 
or processes of medical care.166 Under such circumstances, physicians are 
expected to take steps to ensure that the new technology is appropriate for a 
particular patient, thereby mitigating their risk of liability.167 These steps include 
(a) acquiring knowledge about the safety and effectiveness of the new technology 
and of the scientific evidence base that supports it, (b) obtaining appropriate 
training and expertise prior to actually using the technology, (c) evaluating any 
specific risks posed by the technology in connection with particular types of 
procedures or patients, and (d) receiving informed consent from their patients 
prior to undertaking medical procedures on a nonemergency basis.168 Simply put, 
the reasonable physician standard would essentially incorporate a cost-benefit 
analysis whenever a new treatment modality is involved.169 
The seminal case of Helling v. Carey is one such example that integrates cost-
benefit analysis into the reasonable physician standard.170 In Helling, the plaintiff 
sued her ophthalmologist for failing to give her a simple, painless, and inexpensive 
test that would have detected her glaucoma before her symptoms got worse.171 
The defendant argued that his decision was consistent with the customary norms 
of the profession, which did not require the routine administration of the test to 
 
‘Experimental’ Label from Technique, ASRM (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.asrm.org/news/article.aspx?id 
=10358. 
165. Williams, supra note 38, at 524. 
166. Greenberg, supra note 39, at 432. 
167. Id. at 434–37. 
168. These criteria are identical to the ones courts consider when assessing whether a 
physician has breached the standard of care by adopting a noncustomary medical practice. See Bergero 
v. Univ. of S. Cal. Keck Sch. of Med., No. B200595, 2009 WL 946874, at *9–14 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 
2009) (finding that defendant physician was not liable for malpractice for recommending and 
providing PGD via PCR instead of FISH). 
169. See Williams, supra note 38, at 519–21 (integrating both cost-benefit analysis and the 
reasonable physician standard as a potential standard of care for evidence-based medicine). 
170. Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 981 (Wash. 1974). 
171. Id. at 981–82. 
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patients her age.172 The plaintiff contended that adherence to the medical custom 
of not administrating routine pressure tests was not dispositive of 
reasonableness.173 The court found the physician liable and held that the 
reasonable standard of care that should have been followed was to administer the 
inexpensive, harmless, and effective glaucoma pressure test, regardless of what 
was customary at the time.174 Since Helling, glaucoma pressure tests have become 
“a routine part of every eye examination,” regardless of age.175 Like the glaucoma 
pressure test in Helling, optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques involving 
trophectoderm biopsy and comprehensive chromosomal screening methods, such 
as array-CGH, SNP microarrays, and qPCR, also have the ability to transform 
related procedures in reproductive medicine. Optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening methods are highly predictive of the reproductive potential of human 
embryos,176 and may be used to increase pregnancy rates and decrease risks of 
spontaneous abortion and chromosomal syndromes in infertile patients.177 
Furthermore, the high embryo implantation rates achieved through optimized 
PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques mark an extremely significant milestone for 
IVF clinics attempting to circumvent the problem of multiple births via single 
embryo transfer.178 These promising results also signal that the rate of 
misdiagnosis is much lower with optimized methodologies than when compared 
to traditional PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques. Unlike the traditional embryo 
biopsy procedure at the cleavage stage, which requires a high degree of technical 
proficiency,179 and is associated with some risk of reduced implantation 
 
172. Id. at 982. 
173. Id. 
174. See id. at 983–84. 
175. Veronica M. O’Hern, Medicolegal Rounds, 230 JAMA 1577, 1578 (1974). 
176. R.T. Scott, Jr. et al., Comprehensive Chromosome Screening Is Highly Predictive of the Reproductive 
Potential of Human Embryos: A Prospective, Blinded, Nonselection Study, 97 FERTILITY & STERILITY 870, 
870–75 (2012). 
177. Studies using optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening report significantly higher 
implantation rates and ongoing pregnancy rates compared to unscreened control groups, despite 
disparities in maternal age or poor medical history. Forman et al., supra note 30, at 1217; Schoolcraft 
et al., supra note 21, at 1700; Scott, Jr. et al., supra note 30, at S2. 
178. See Forman et al., supra note 31, at S49; William B. Schoolcraft & Mandy G. Katz-Jaffe, 
Comprehensive Chromosome Screening of Trophectoderm with Vitrification Facilitates Elective Single-Embryo Transfer 
for Infertile Women with Advanced Maternal Age, 100 FERTILITY & STERILITY 615, 617–18 (2013) 
(reporting higher implantation rates, higher ongoing pregnancy rates, and lower spontaneous 
miscarriage rates in advanced maternal age (AMA) patients following blastocyst CCS with vitrification 
and frozen single embryo transfer compared with AMA patients in the non-CCS group that 
underwent single embryo transfer. AMA patients in the CCS group had reproductive outcomes 
similar to their younger counterparts following blastocyst CCS with vitrification and frozen embryo 
transfer); Yang et al., supra note 31, at 24. 
179. King, supra note 19, at 307 (“[I]mprecise or unskilled embryo biopsy can substantially 
harm the embryo, preventing implantation and development.”). For instance, PGS practitioners have 
questioned the quality of the embryo biopsy procedures performed in the seminal Mastenbroek study, 
as approximately twenty percent of embryos in the PGS group had “undetermined” chromosomal 
status compared with five percent in experienced laboratories. See Mastenbroek et al., supra note 16, at 
16 tbl.4; PGD Pioneers, supra note 21. 
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potential,180 almost every cultured blastocyst subjected to trophectoderm biopsy 
survives the procedure.181 Thus, trophectoderm sampling is a much simpler, safer 
alternative. Lastly, improvements in DNA sequencing have made it increasingly 
practical to generate large amounts of sequence data with the use of high-
throughput next-generation sequencing (NGS) machines, for which the cost per 
reaction is falling drastically.182 Studies are currently underway to evaluate the 
feasibility of NGS for preimplantation embryo assessment, which, if successful, 
would significantly lower the costs of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening.183 
One caveat of the optimized technology is that it disadvantages patients who 
suffer from diminished ovarian reserve (DOR).184 DOR patients produce poor-
quality oocytes and embryos, and only have a small number of embryos available 
for trophectoderm biopsy.185 Thus, women with DOR cannot be expected to 
derive outcome benefits from day-five blastocyst transfers compared to day-three 
cleavage-stage embryo transfers.186 However, even under this scenario, a physician 
who is leaning toward providing optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening would still 
be able to mitigate the risk of liability. First, the physician must receive the 
patient’s informed consent after disclosing the risks and benefits of both the 
recommended treatment and the medically acceptable alternatives. Second, the 
physician would still have to exercise his or her best judgment and alter the course 
of treatment in the event that early warning symptoms arise. For instance, the 
physician would suspect that a patient suffers from DOR based on the low 
numbers of cleavage-stage embryos. At that moment, the physician could point 
the patient toward other medically acceptable alternatives (such as day-three 
embryo transfer without PGS screening or oocyte donation) and alter the course 
of treatment accordingly. Given these circumstances, a reasonable physician may 
conclude that the risk of liability for adopting optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening is not as daunting as it would seem at first blush. The reasonable 
physician standard thus eliminates the hurdles that a custom-based standard places 
on ART physicians desiring to disregard customary practices, and allows the 
standard of care to evolve in response to medical advances. 
 
180. Cohen et al., supra note 20; Cohen & Grifo, supra note 21. 
181. See studies cited supra note 31. In fact, critics question the value of retaining traditional 
PGS-aneuploidy screening methods given the technical proficiency barriers. See Fragouli & Wells, 
supra note 2, at 291 (“[E]ven if it is true that FISH-based analyses can be beneficial, the fact that so 
few laboratories are able to demonstrate any efficacy is indicative of a technology that is not 
sufficiently robust, leading to problems applying it in different laboratories.”). 
182. Julio Martin et al., The Impact of Next-Generation Sequencing Technology on Preimplantation 
Genetic Diagnosis and Screening, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1054, 1055 (2013). 
183. XuYang Yin et al., Massively Parallel Sequencing for Chromosomal Abnormality Testing in 
Trophectoderm Cells of Human Blastocysts, 88 BIOLOGY REPROD. 69 (2013). 
184. Norbert Gleicher & David H. Barad, A Review of, and Commentary on, the Ongoing Second 
Clinical Introduction of Preimplantation Genetic Screening (PGS) to Routine IVF Practice, 29 J. ASSISTED 
REPROD. & GENETICS 1159, 1163 (2012). 
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C. Dismissing Objections to the Proposed Standard of Care 
One may contend that physicians have no duty to offer patients optimized 
PGS-aneuploidy screenings because the treatment is still experimental. Indeed, 
some courts have held that experimental treatments are not therapies that fall 
within the definition of medically acceptable alternatives.187 This Note contends 
that optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening no longer fits within the ASRM’s 
definition of “experimental procedures,” and thus should not be classified as such. 
According to the ASRM, “[p]rocedures (including tests, treatments, or other 
interventions) for the diagnosis or treatment of infertility will be considered 
experimental or investigational until the published medical evidence regarding 
their risks, benefits, and overall safety and efficacy is sufficient to regard them as 
established medical practice.”188 The ASRM states that “relevant medical evidence 
can derive only from appropriately designed, peer-reviewed, published studies 
performed by multiple independent investigators, including a description of 
materials and methods sufficient to assess their scientific validity and to allow 
independent verification.”189 Several influential studies demonstrate that 
comprehensive molecular cytogenetic methodologies are highly predictive of the 
implantation potential of human embryos,190 and that blastocyst biopsy is safer 
and thus preferable to cleavage-stage embryo biopsy.191 Numerous clinical trials 
have since combined blastocyst biopsy with comprehensive molecular cytogenetic 
methodologies to assess their overall efficacy in improving reproductive 
outcomes.192 Implantation rates and ongoing pregnancy rates using optimized 
PGS-aneuploidy screening are significantly higher compared to untreated controls, 
a trend that has been consistent across multiple studies from independent groups, 
regardless of age or medical prognosis.193 Another recent study has revealed that 
qPCR-based CCS is comparable with the current standard of care (double 
unscreened embryo transfer), and eliminates the problem of multiple pregnancy.194 
As of August 2012, optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening methods have been used 
in more than 3000 IVF cycles at nine centers in the United States.195 This trend 
 
187. Garrett v. United States, 667 F. Supp. 1147, 1162–63 (W.D. La. 1987) (“This court will 
not find malpractice in the treating physician’s failure to adopt a ‘controversial’ treatment modality 
which is not commonly accepted in the medical profession. . . . This court would violate the long-
established standard of care for physicians if it held a doctor liable for failing to use experimental and 
unproven treatment on one of his patients.”); Del Valle Rivera v. United States, 630 F. Supp. 750, 
755–56 (D.P.R. 1986). 
188. Practice Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 160, at 1517. 
189. Id. 
190. Scott, Jr. et al., supra note 176, at 870. 
191. McArthur et al., supra note 29, at 1628; N.R. Treff et al., Cleavage Stage Embryo Biopsy 
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of Cotransferred Biopsied and Nonbiopsied Sibling Embryos, 96 FERTILITY & STERILITY S2 (2011). 
192. See studies cited supra notes 29–31. 
193. Forman et al., supra note 30, at 1217; Schoolcraft et al., supra note 21, at 1700; Scott, Jr. et 
al., supra note 30, at S2; Yang et al., supra note 31, at 24. 
194. Forman et al., supra note 31, at S49. 
195. Nathan R. Treff & Richard T. Scott, Jr., Four-Hour Quantitative Real-Time Polymerase Chain 
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also suggests that there is a substantial percentage of reputable experts within the 
field of reproductive medicine that favor optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening 
methodologies over generally accepted methods involving FISH and cleavage-
stage biopsy. Furthermore, a few scholars have expressed optimism about 
universally applying improved PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques with routine 
IVF procedures for patients in all age groups.196 The well-designed, peer-reviewed, 
published studies referenced above represent the accuracy, safety, and clinical 
efficacy of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening techniques. Therefore, under the 
ASRM’s own guidelines, PGS should no longer be classified as an experimental 
procedure. 
And even if optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening retains the “experimental” 
classification, a physician is still not absolved of the duty to inform patients of the 
existence of the experimental treatment if it is accepted as an appropriate 
treatment by some substantial percentage of practitioners in the relevant 
specialty.197 In Wachter v. United States, the physician failed to inform the patient of 
the possibility to use the internal mammary artery for a coronary bypass operation 
instead of the saphenous vein.198 Applying the lay standard of informed consent, 
the court held that the internal mammary artery procedure was not a “medically 
significant alternative” because the procedure was not a choice among treatment 
modalities.199 The court explained that the procedure was not in general use, not 
then known among surgeons to produce better results, and not the subject of any 
definitive study showing it would be better to use than a saphenous vein graft in a 
coronary bypass operation.200 Unlike Wachter, optimized PGS-aneuploidy 
screening techniques are medically acceptable alternatives because they have been 
repeatedly scrutinized during numerous clinical trials, and were found to be safer, 
more accurate, and more efficacious than traditional PGS screening methods.201 
Indeed, specialists who make a good-faith effort to keep abreast of current 
advances in ART would know that the application of these optimized techniques 
results in superior clinical outcomes, regardless of the patient’s age or poor 
 
Reaction–Based Comprehensive Chromosome Screening and Accumulating Evidence of Accuracy, Safety, Predictive 
Value, and Clinical Efficacy, 99 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1049, 1052 (2013). 
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Leigh Simpson, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis to Improve Pregnancy Outcomes in Subfertility, 26 BEST 
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197. Archer v. Galbraith, 567 P.2d 1155, 1161 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a patient 
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1989). 
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medical prognosis.202 Moreover, the fact that optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening 
is not yet a general practice in the ART field does not shield a physician from 
liability for failing to inform patients of the experimental therapy. Because these 
improved methodologies are accepted as treatment modalities that are supported 
by some substantial percentage of reputable and respected experts in reproductive 
medicine,203 these treatments fall within the definition of “medically acceptable” 
alternatives. Thus, ART physicians still have the duty to inform their patients of 
the existence of optimized PGS-aneuploidy screening, notwithstanding its 
experimental classification. 
CONCLUSION 
Modern medicine is largely a product of innovation grounded in empirical 
science. But any time a physician adopts an emerging technology that can 
transform the nature or delivery of clinical care, there is always the potential for a 
new set of malpractice risks. This uncertainty can be so unsettling to physicians 
that it may actually deter them from adopting new technologies that would best 
serve the interests of their patients. The proposed standard of care in this Note 
comports with the Learned Hand formula in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 
which defines negligence as failing to take precautions whose costs do not exceed 
the potential loss, multiplied by the probability of that loss.204 The reasonable 
physician standard is the optimal framework for assessing the standard of care for 
adopting emerging medical technologies because it is dynamic and easy to 
administer, and is not over- or underinclusive. Many jurisdictions are already quite 
familiar with judging physicians by standards of reasonable prudence,205 and 
courts have had over half a century of experience applying the Hand formula.206 
The reasonable physician standard also remedies problems of over- and 
underinclusiveness that exist under a custom-based standard by liberating courts 
from having to “hold every physician who deviates from custom liable and from 
having to exonerate every physician who follows custom.”207 Most importantly, 
the reasonable physician standard is dynamic because it allows the standard of care 
to evolve in light of current medical advances by reducing the chilling effects that 
a “custom-based standard places on physicians desiring to disregard customary 
practice.”208 
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Under the reasonable physician standard, courts would hold physicians 
accountable for the failure to recommend, or provide patients with, optimized 
PGS-aneuploidy screening, to the extent that not doing so violates Hand’s 
formula, which is essentially the same standard employed in Helling v. Carey. 
Imposing such a duty on physicians advances compelling policies, including 
protecting the health and safety of vulnerable ART patients; encouraging physician 
and patient autonomy in clinical decision making; promoting the reproductive 
autonomy of individuals with recurring, but surmountable, fertility issues; and 
facilitating the rapid development of state-of-the-art techniques and devices in 
reproductive medicine. 
 
